Thirty-five of 202 electricity systems lost more than a percentage point of renewable share from 2015 to 2021 -- and the highest-share economies led the retreat

The World Bank's renewable electricity series (EG.ELC.RNEW.ZS, sourced from the International Energy Agency) records electricity output from hydropower, solar, wind, geothermal, and biomass as a share of each economy's total. Among 202 economies in the series with non-null values in both 2015 and 2021 — the latest year available — the world aggregate rose from 22.98% to 27.84%. Thirty-five of those 202 economies saw their renewable electricity share fall by more than 1 percentage point over the same six years. They were not spread evenly across the distribution. Among the 52 economies that generated more than half their electricity from renewables in 2015, 20 — 38.5% — fell. Among the 150 that started below 50%, 15 fell — 10.0%. The highest-share economies were nearly 4 times more likely to move backward. Most of the declines were in sub-Saharan Africa and South and Southeast Asia. Malawi's renewable share fell from 99.1% to 80.1%. Ghana's fell from 50.9% to 34.9%. Myanmar's fell from 67.2% to 50.8%. Kenya's fell from 85.6% to 78.1%. Pakistan's fell from 33.1% to 28.3%.

The following is analysis, not fact. The pattern points to a structural feature of hydro-dependent electricity systems. Most of the 20 high-share economies that fell are in sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, or South and Southeast Asia, where the majority of renewable electricity comes from large hydroelectric dams built decades ago. Those dams have a geographic ceiling: once the viable rivers are tapped, adding more electricity generally means building something other than hydro. When demand grows fast — urbanization, manufacturing growth, poverty reduction — and hydro capacity has reached its buildable limit, thermal generation typically fills the gap. [speculative — the data shows the outcome; this is the mechanistic interpretation, not a cause the series isolates] The framing is consistent with ^sspeculative specific country trajectories. Ghana expanded gas-fired generation from its offshore fields as hydroelectric output fluctuated; the renewable share lost 16 percentage points. Myanmar built gas capacity to reduce load-shedding; the share fell 16.4 points. Pakistan added liquefied natural gas capacity at scale starting around 2015, diluting a hydro-heavy starting mix; the share narrowed by 4.8 points. Kenya's geothermal sector expanded significantly — yet total electricity demand grew faster, and the share still fell 7.5 points. The world aggregate improved as large economies with low starting renewable shares — primarily in Europe — built wind and solar at sufficient scale to move it. [speculative — the aggregate rose; attributing the rise to European wind and solar is interpretation, not a decomposition this share series provides] The hydro-dependent developing economies moving in the opposite direction are small in absolute electricity generation, but not in population. Together, the 20 high-share economies that fell are home to hundreds of millions of people in the middle of their first large-scale electrification wave. The SDG 7.2 goal — "increase substantially the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix" — is a global collective target, not a per-country quota. It does not require each economy to hold or improve its individual share. Renewable electricity is a large but partial component of that energy mix, which also spans heat and transport. But countries' own energy statistics, compiled for annual SDG progress tracking, show 35 of 202 electricity systems moving opposite to the direction the goal names, six years into the decade intended to close the gap.

A falling renewable share is not the same as falling renewable generation. Many of these economies added hydroelectric or geothermal capacity in absolute terms while their percentage fell — what grew was everything else, faster. The SDG 7.2 frame is global, not per-country: an economy that added gas alongside hydro has not violated a binding commitment. Some energy economists argue that reaching the energy-poor is the more pressing priority, and that constraining thermal expansion in sub-Saharan Africa or South Asia to protect a percentage metric would sacrifice human development for optics. The 2021 data also captures a period of unusual hydro variability — drought years in parts of Africa and South America may have depressed renewable shares that have since recovered.

From Kenya, Ghana, or Pakistan, the share-metric story can read differently. These are economies where electricity shortages have been acute and rural access has been a stated policy priority — where a falling renewable percentage that accompanies expanding generation capacity looks, from inside those grids, more like energy poverty reduction than climate regression. Whether that framing holds when weighed against infrastructure lock-in is the open question: a gas-fired plant built in 2019 carries a 30-year operating life. [speculative — our inference of how policymakers in these economies would likely frame their own data]